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Though we have presented here two sep-
arate and independent studies, it should be
evident that they were not conducted in
complete isolation from one another.
Rather, the intent was to make them com-
plementary enough to permit some tenta-
tive examination of the connection between
the social values held by a nation’s elites
and the sort of foreign policy which that
nation pursues. Our working assumption
was that, while those who make and artic-
ulate foreign policy are not necessarily re-
cruited from all of the various elite groups
in a modem society, they will neverthe-
less tend to come essentially from the same
social background as the others do. Though
some appreciable deviations from this pat-
tern might be expected in newly indepen-
dent nations or in revolutionary regimes, we
would not expect them in two such societies
as the US and the USSR. Thus it seems
reasonable to expect that the social values
of the policy-makers should have a great
deal in common with those of the other
elites. When we move, however, from so-
cial values about internal matters to those
specifically relevant to foreign policy, cer-
tain differences may well be expected, and
they do in fact occur.
Perhaps more interesting in a study such
as this is the question of how such general
social values find expression in specific for-
eign policy attitudes. That we could not
expect to infer such focused attitudes di-
rectly from diffuse value clusters is evident;
too many other considerations intervene, re-
quiring the adaptation of social preferences
to political necessity. Thus deviations from
the direct inferential line between elite
values and foreign policy attitudes should
be expected. On the other hand, these devi-
ations should be minimized either as the
value dimensions become more specific or
as the foreign policy attitude dimension be-
comes more general. Since this is in fact
the case in our two studies, it seems rea-
sonable to expect an appreciable congru-
ence between the two sets of findings.
Before turning to a summary of such con-
gruence, and deviations therefrom, two
caveats are in order. As we have already
emphasized, certain distortions are inevita-
ble in the path between either values or at-
titudes and their alleged expression in the
media. In all societies-especially those as
deeply involved in conflict as the US and
the USSR were in the 1957-1960 period-
elite articulations must serve many pur-
poses. They must conceal certain domestic
cleavages and exploit others, they must mo-
bilize the society and reinforce loyalties,
they must inform some segments of the
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public and confuse others, they must
threaten some foreign societies and reassure
others. That is, many value and attitude ar-
ticulations, even if not particularly concrete
and specific, are made with the conscious
intent to influence the recipient. Of course,
one of the purposes of content analysis is
to reduce or eliminate the distorting effect
of such deliberately misleading statements;
the more carefully and knowledgeably de-
signed one’s dimension construction and
coding rules are, the more likely the study
is to penetrate or circumvent the simplifica-
tions and falsifications which are thrown up.
Though we have given careful attention to
the relationship which exists between our
many articulating elites and their diverse
audiences, and have considered in a most
skeptical fashion the various purposes of
their communications, there is no satisfac-
tory way of fully validating our results and
procedures. A variety of techniques in a
variety of other contexts must be used, and
their results compared. What we have
done, however, is to tap in on many of the
communication channels between these
elites and their domestic and foreign audi-
ences and, by systematic observation, we
have sought to identify the major strands
of their value preferences and their foreign
policy attitudes.
Secondly, it should be emphasized that,
even if we have captured these values and
attitudes with some accuracy, the results
must not be taken too literally as predictors
of domestic or foreign policy. It is well
established that all such ideological phe-
nomena merely serve as guidelines to policy
behavior. Even though we believe that we
are tapping the operational, rather than the
formal and official, end of the ideological
spectrum, it must be emphasized that the
relative importance of discrete values and
attitudes can only be known when painful
choices between conflicting demands have
been made. When a foreign policy elite
expresses a strong commitment to the mili-
tary doctrine of retaliation-only, for exam-
ple, it may nevertheless be under powerful
pressure to violate the doctrine if the op-
portunity for quick victory presents itself
or if the adversary gives evidence of grasp-
ing such an opportunity for himself. Or
when an elite appears to be firmly com-
mitted to free and unfettered international
trade, it may still utilize boycotts, embar-
goes, and export quotas when political ne-
cessity appears to override economic values.
Despite the most clear and unequivocal ar-
ticulations, values and attitudes can only
be fully observed and measured when they
are tested in the crucible of conflicting pref-
erences and difficult choices.
Returning, then, to a summary of the
congruities and incongruities found between
social values and foreign policy attitudes in
the two societies, let us compare some of
the results which emerged. We will focus
primarily on those values bearing on exter-
nal relations and compare them with the
related dimensions in the foreign policy
attitude study. Bearing in mind the com-
plex and circular relationship between these
two sets of social phenomena, we will nor-
mally want to ask whether the relationship
is best understood as: (a) values influenc-
ing policy attitudes; (b) policy imperatives
influencing values; or (c) adversary’s values
influencing attitudes.
Looking first at the value dimension en-
titled Political and Military Relations to
Other Nations in the Bloc, we find that it is
logically connected with only one of the
foreign policy dimensions-the basis and
motivation for alliances (B-5). The connec-
tion seems to be of the second type for the
United States. That is, the US elites tend
to take the position that a good bloc is one
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in which there is national autonomy beyond
the obligations imposed by specific com-
mitments. They also see their alliances as
mainly resulting from a need for protection
from aggression. One can argue that the
need for security produced the Western
bloc, and that it then appeared to be the
right kind of bloc. The Soviet elites, on the
other hand, believe in a monolithic bloc;
and they see their alliances as largely spring-
ing from the similarity of the nations’ social
systems and beliefs. There seems to be no
causal connection here in either direction.
The value preference is undoubtedly a fact.
But to say that the reason for tight alliances
is the similarity of the national systems in-
volved is contrary to all historical experi-
ence. It appears to be a pure rationaliza-
tion.
One of the cases in which values should
underlie foreign policy attitudes involves
the dimension Relations to Uncommitted
Nations and the motivation for giving eco-
nomic and technical assistance (D-9).
Here we encounter seeming contradictions
on both sides. American elites say either
that uncommitted nations should be left to
decide their own destinies or that they
should be persuaded to throw in their lot
with the United States. But they admit that
the main reasons for economic and techni-
cal aid are to strengthen the United States
side of the Cold War, or at least to keep
uncommitted countries neutral. On the
level of policy US elites appear to be more
frank than in their stated value preferences.
The Soviet elites show an opposite contra-
diction. They usually see the ideal situation
to be revolutionary movements in the un-
committed countries that will bring them
into the Communist camp, but the reason for
economic and technical assistance is rarely
seen as the strengthening of the Soviet side.
Here the value statement seems to be more
frank than the foreign policy attitude. These
results possibly reflect a difference between
the US and the USSR in their view of his-
tory. The latter believes that history is
working with it and therefore that revolu-
tionary movements do not have to be
&dquo;bribed&dquo; through aid programs. The United
States elites perhaps feel that they are
working against a tide which makes impos-
sible the carrying out in practice of values
they theoretically cherish.
In this instance we have data not only
on the elites’ own value position but their
perception of the other country’s value po-
sition. The most direct evidence is dimen-
sion C-7. Here both sides state that the op-
ponents are using economic and technical
aid in order to strengthen their bloc and
weaken the other. Much the same belief
is revealed in C-1, where one-quarter to
one-third of the items on each side stand for
a belief that the other is out to dominate
the world.
The value dimension Trade with Mem-
bers of the Other Bloc is comparable with
the foreign policy attitude on free interna-
tional trade (D-10). Because American
value data were sparse and diffuse, no com-
parison on this side is possible. The Soviet
data are highly consistent. Soviet elites
believe in freely trading with the Western
bloc and almost unanimously take the posi-
tion that it can pave the way for a political
settlement or at least tension reduction.
Degree of Trust toward Members of the
Other Bloc is a value dimension that is very
similar to A-1, the dimension of foreign
policy having to do with the character of
international politics. It should be recalled
that American elites, especially the military,
saw a trustful attitude as less desirable than
did the Soviet elites. Consistently, the
American perception of the international
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situation was one of more persistent con-
flict.
One would expect that the same differ-
ence would be recorded in connection with
the necessary relations between states of
differing sociopolitical characteristics (A-4).
Oddly enough it does not appear. Neither
side gives much credence to the proposi-
tion that the countries must clash militarily.
It is possible that, though the American de-
cision-makers thought of persistent conflict
as most likely, they believed the US deter-
rent power great enough to make armed
conflict unlikely.
The findings on each side’s operational
code are fairly consistent with the expressed
value positions. The Soviet foreign policy
attitudes in dimensions D-5 and D-6, hav-
ing to do with whether political settlement
must precede disarmament and whether
controls must be imposed first, show their
elite as articulating a more trusting position
than that of the American elite. On the
other hand, the Soviet data are very in-
consistent. Despite the frequent expression
of a preference for trusting the Western
bloc, 24 percent of the data in C-1 indicate
that they think the United States is aiming
to dominate the world. And, though data
are few in C-5, what few there are indi-
cate a belief that the US would not hesitate
to strike first with nuclear weapons. The
American data are somewhat more consis-
tent. Since US elites do not value trust as
frequently, their strong belief that the ad-
versary wants to dominate the world and
includes the preventive or preemptive
strike in its strategic doctrine is more under-
standable.
The value dimension War as a Means of
National Policy can also be related to a
good many of the foreign policy attitudes.
We shall confine our treatment to those in
which the relation seems most compelling.
Both sides were found almost unanimously
at the position that only a defensive war is
justified. The data on dimension A-4 are
consistent with this, since they show little
belief that the two sides must inevitably
clash militarily. The Soviet belief that the
power balance was shifting in their direc-
tion (A-7) was perfectly consistent with
their value position. Since, however, one-
third of the items on the American side
showed a belief that the balance was shift-
ing in favor of the Soviet Union, one may
wonder whether the American consensus
on a preference for only defensive war rep-
resents the true belief for that period.
Three of the items in the B group seem
logically related to the value dimension War
as a Means of National Policy, but it is not
clear which way the causation runs. On
B-1, both sides are strongly of the opinion
that they are invulnerable to a surprise first
strike. Both sides also believe that they can
deter the other (B-2). Did they achieve
these abilities because they did not want to
fight unless attacked, or have they reached
the value preference as a result of the at-
tainment of these abilities? Dimension B-10
has to do with whether a nuclear war would
be worth winning. The United States at-
titudes are very pessimistic, the Soviet elites
only a little less so. These views are almost
certainly causal to the preference for a de-
fensive posture rather than results of it.
Three dimensions ( C-1, C-3, and C-5 z
allow us to see whether either society’s po-
sition on War as a Means of National Policy
is judged by the opponents to be what the
elites claim it to be. As would be expected,
there is a notable lack of fit. Whereas both
sets of elites claim that they would not fight
a war of aggression, the belief of the op-
ponent is that they are more belligerent
than this; 24 percent of the relevant Soviet
items say that world domination is the prin-
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cipal goal of American foreign policy, 59
percent say that the major instrument of
American foreign policy is direct military
force, and 100 percent say that a preven-
tive or preemptive strike is part of Ameri-
can military doctrine. The corresponding
figures for American items commenting on
Soviet policy are 31 percent, 28 percent,
and 90 percent. If the alleged value posi-
tions are true ones, then there is a great
deal of misperception.
It will be recalled that the dimension The
Way to World Order showed that the So-
viet elites followed the coexistence line very
closely. The American elites divided their
preferences between this position and one
that saw order resulting from value con-
vergence that would make international law
effective. There are two dimensions, B-9
and D-3, that can be related to this value
dimension. The two are very different, one
having to do with how each expects to pre-
vail over the other and the second having
to do with how peace can best be main-
tained. The Soviet attitudes can be squared
with the coexistence value without much
difficulty. They expect to win by their own
strengths and American weaknesses; and
only 18 percent of the items state that peace
can best be maintained by Soviet military
power. Nor is there any necessary incon-
sistency in the fact that Americans expect
to win the Cold War almost entirely
through Soviet weaknesses. But it is hard
to square the frequently expressed prefer-
ence for value convergence with the fact
that almost half the American items state
that peace can best be maintained through
American military power.
Finally, the dimension Relation to In-
ternational Agencies can be compared both
with the dimension just discussed (D-3)
and to D-7, which has to do with political
decision-making in the United Nations. On
the Soviet side the results are fairly consis-
tent. Their elites were less enthusiastic in
their evaluation of the United Nations than
were the American elites and that organiza-
tion was not cited as often in their foreign
policy materials as the best instrument to
maintain peace. Similarly, the Soviet for-
eign policy items inclined more to insist
upon great-power unanimity in the United
Nations than did those on the American
side. This insistence on the veto indicates
considerable distrust of the United Nations
as it was then constituted.
We have found, then, what could have
been anticipated, that there are three levels
here: (1) what nations do in international
relations; (2) what their decision-makers
say their foreign policies are; and (3) what
members of elites say their value prefer-
ences are.
In conclusion, our hope in this enterprise
was to build a somewhat more solid empir-
ical base for the study of foreign policies
than has hitherto been available. That is,
we sought not so much to describe and ana-
lyze the policies of these two societies as to
expose some of the ideological and attitudi-
nal factors which might predict to these
policies. Bearing in mind the distinction
between actual behavior and verbalization
about it, we can only hope that we have
illuminated some of the linkages between
elite values and attitudes on the one hand
and foreign policy on the other. Two fur-
ther studies would seem to be suggested by
those presented here, if their validity and
utility are to be ascertained. In one, it might
be quite valuable to assemble a panel of
perhaps ten independent judges, and then
provide them with three sets of materials:
(a) the finished report on value preferences
embodied in Part I; (b) a formulation of
our model relating elite values to foreign
policy operational codes; and (c) a blank
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form of the foreign policy attitudes report
found in Part II. The task would be to see
how accurately our value data and model
would predict to the foreign policy attitude
results. Of course, failure to replicate our
findings could, with more or less equal
probability, be attributed to inadequacies in
the value data, the model, the attitude data,
or-unfortunately-the judges. Equally in-
teresting, but more difficult, might be an
effort to: (a) sample and then code the
foreign policy behaviors of the two powers
during, or perhaps after, the period studied;
(b) on the basis of our findings in the pres-
ent study, predict independently what these
behaviors should have been; and (c) com-
pare the results. Again, low correlations
may not necessarily be attributable to any
one of the given sets of data, but such an
effort to move back and forth between ar-
ticulation and overt action could be a chal-
lenging enterprise indeed. The foreign poli-
cies of the major powers are relevant
enough to man’s survival today to warrant a
considerably more empirical and rigorous
approach than that hitherto utilized. We
hope that this is a small step in that direc-
tion.
